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Abstract
This paper discusses the feasibility of the so-called “double dividend” of the environmental tax reform
(ETR) in Japan using a computable general equilibrium analysis. The ETR not only introduces tax against
the climate change but also recycles revenue in lowering some existing distortionary taxes. The CGE
model with 16 production sectors and 27 commodities (including 14 energy products) based on the 1997
Input-Output Table avails in analyzing the necessary carbon and energy tax to meet Japan’s goal of CO2
reduction (here: 6% less than in 1990), and the economic cost or gain of the ETR. As a result, about
30,000 yen/tC of carbon-energy tax on fossil fuels such as coal will be necessary by 2010. This will cause a
moderate economic impact. Consequently, an even more economic gain (more GDP-growth and employ-
ment) can be achieved if revenue is allotted to reduce labor cost. One of the reasons for this result is the
assumption of the non-cleared labor market. The effects of special treatment on heavy industries are also
analyzed. There will be more employment and growth when the halved carbon-energy tax rates are applied
to the four heavy industrial sectors, but the tax rate for other sectors and consumers must be higher. It can
also be shown that by dividing the consumption sector into five income classes, the change of prices by
this energy taxation can in itself be regressive, but the overall effect of the ETR will be rather proportional.
Keywords :  Environmental tax reform, Double dividend, Computable general equilibrium (CGE), Japan
0. Introduction
Although environmental tax such as carbon tax is widely recognized as a burden on the economy, it
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may even improve economic activity depending on how the environmental tax revenues are used. The
idea of a so-called “double dividend” of an environmental tax reform (ETR) is one of the topics dis-
cussed and debated in recent literature of environmental economics. The double dividend consists of a
“better environment” and an “improved economic activity”.
The double-dividend hypothesis has widely accepted among European policy makers (although the
debate among specialists is not finished), which lead many European countries to introduce the ETR.
Despite the fact that the policy of “killing two birds with one stone” has been popular in Europe,
Japanese economists or policy makers do not seem to be interested in this hypothesis. The introduction
of carbon tax here is mainly discussed in the context of a trade-off between economy and ecology. Some
reports on environmental tax by the Ministry of Environment (the former Environment Agency) contain
reviews of empirical studies that analyzed the effects and costs of carbon tax, but none of them have
examined whether the specific type of revenue recycling leads to more growth or employment1.
In this paper we investigate the possibility of economic gain through the ETR in Japan using a com-
putable general equilibrium model (CGE). Namely, the CGE model is compatible with the neo-classical
theory concerning the feasibility of the double dividend.
1. On the double dividend hypothesis
An environmental tax reform which consists of environmental tax (especially tax on environmental-
ly harmful goods or resources) and revenue recycling through reducing the rate of existing tax or social
security contributions may bring about the so called “double dividend”. The first dividend means the
environmental benefit from internalizing external effects (better environment), and the second dividend
means (non-environmental) economic benefits from reducing excess burdens of existing taxes
(improved economic activity such as higher GDP or employment). 
Until the beginning of the ’90s, it was taken for granted that a tax shift from economic goods (such
as labor or capital) to the bads (pollution or resource intensive goods) will bring about the double divi-
dend. In the middle of ’90s, however, negative arguments based on the well-built “theory of second-best
taxation” became predominant. They insist that the ETR will exacerbate the distortion of existing taxes
so that the second dividend will be more than offset (Oates 1995, de Mooij 1999). 
According to de Mooij (1999), the second dividend can be decomposed into two factors in the theo-
ry of second-best taxation. The first factor is the revenue recycling effect (RE), which means the
reduced excess burden is induced by reducing rates of existing taxes. The other is the tax interaction
effect (IE), which results from the erosion of tax bases (e.g. reduced labor supply) because of the rise
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in prices or the decline in real wages induced by environmental taxation. In normal conditions, RE is
positive and IE is negative. If RE>IE, there will be a positive effect on non-environmental welfare
(“strong double dividend”). If RE<IE, the strong double dividend will not occur, but there will be a
“weak double dividend”, since revenue recycling through reduction of other distortionary taxes is more
meaningful (RE>0) than through reduction of non-distortionary taxes, income transfer to households
(so called lump-sum recycling) or government spending (RE=0). Positive employment effects of envi-
ronmental tax reform is also possible regardless of the “strong” or “weak” double dividend, which may
be socially or politically desirable (employment double dividend). On top of this, there is (and has been)
almost no doubt among specialists on the feasibility of the first dividend (the so called Pigouvian Effect
(PE)) in the current status with the external effect yet to be internalized, because the demand on addi-
tively taxed goods will decrease according to the simplest law of demand.
As mentioned, in the middle of the ’90s the feasibility of the strong (or employment) double divi-
dend is almost rejected, that is, the IE was considered to be greater than the RE. On the contrary, since
the end of the ’90s papers that theoretically define specific situations under which the strong double
dividend is possible can be found (Scholtz 1998, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1998, Parry and Bento
2000). Recent reviewers also show that many empirical works result in a strong or employment double
dividend (Bosquet 2000, Bosello et al. 2001). According to Bosselo et al. (2001), the assumption of an
imperfect labor market and especially the existence of involuntary unemployment contributes to this
positive result. Accordingly it seems to be possible to say that the chance of the double dividend is quite
promising under current Japanese economy. Furthermore, Goodstein (2003) strongly supported the
possibility of the strong double dividend casting doubt on the alleged negative IE in the context of the
theory of second best taxation.
The following section discusses the idea and the structure of the model. In section 3 the policy
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Table 1: Three definitions of the double dividend
See e.g. de Mooij (1999)
DOUBLE DIVIDEND FIRST DIVIDEND SECOND DIVIDEND
(environmental effect) (non-environmental economic effect)
strong double dividend positive non-environmental welfare higher than before 
ETR (RE+IE>0)(PE>0)
weak double dividend positive non-environmental welfare higher than with lump
sum recycling (RE>0)(PE>0)
employment double positive employment higher than before ETR
dividend (PE>0)
options are defined. And in the section 4 these results are presentated and evaluated. Section 5 consists
of a conclusion.
2. The idea and the structure of the ETR-CGE Model
The purpose of this ETR-CGE Model is to analyze the effect of an ETR intended to reduce CO2-
emissions or energy consumption in the context of the double-dividend debate. The policy instrument
to be introduced is the carbon-and-energy tax (hereafter referred to as C&E tax) that is once  proposed
by the EC Commission, whose tax base is both energy and carbon content of sources of energy. The
environmental goal of this policy here is to reduce CO2-emissions in 2010 by 6% under the level of 19902.
The rate of this tax will be adjusted to reach this goal. The revenue will either be allotted to government
spending or recycled through boosting the social security payment or reducing the rates of taxes or
social security contributions. The choice of revenue application has great implications for GDP-level and
growth, income distribution and employment. 
The ETR-CGE model is based on the 1995 Input-Output Table. Here only the outline will be shown
(see the Appendix for more detail). There are 16 production sectors and 5 income classes of households
in the Model. They supply and demand goods and factors according to their optimizing behavior. The
production sectors and their cost shares are shown in table 2. Final demands consist of government
spending (investment and consumption), private spending (investment and consumption), and the for-
eign sector (export minus import). The capital is fixed in production sectors in the short run, but it is
flexible in the long run because sectors with a higher rate of return will invest more. Household income
stems from labor income and capital income, which will be spent on goods and services or saved accord-
ing to the interest rate. The behavior of the industry and households are rational in the short term but
not intertemporally optimal. International trade is modeled by simply using an Armington function,
namely without explicitly modeling the foreign economic subject.
In this model, prices of goods are adjusted to balance the supply and demand of all goods. The
interest rate is also adjusted to match investment and savings, where no international capital flow is
taken into account. The effect on employment is analyzed under the assumption of an imperfect labor
market where the nominal wage rate is fixed and the supply of labor is higher than demand.
One of the special characteristics of this model is the detailed division of energy commodities and
taxes. Fourteen energy commodities are treated as endogenous input factors. Demands on energies are
determined by factor demand functions or consumption functions. The C&E tax will raise prices of
energies; hereby change of price rates differ according to the sort of energy and to the sector in which it
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is used. The private household is divided into five income classes, which enables the vertical distribution
effects of an environmental tax reform to be analyzed. In this paper, as mentioned above, the labor mar-
ket is assumed to be in a disequilibrium because the nominal wage is not flexible (in this model it is sim-
ply a fixed constant). This assumptions is crucial to the double dividend. The labor demand is deter-
mined by the factor demand of each sector but the labor supply is exogenously determined, and unem-
ployment is defined by their gap3. The basic data used is from the government’s statistics such as
“Input-Output Table (1995)” including the Tables of Physical Quantity, the “Annual Report on
National Accounts (2000)” and the “Annual Report on the Family Income and Expenditure
Survey (1995)”. Data of the specific CO2-emmission are from the EDMC’s “Handbook of Energy &
Economic Statistics in Japan (2000)” or the former Environment Agency’s data (1994).
The scale parameters or tax rates in this model are calibrated to the 1995 data, and the elasticity
parameters are set exogenously (Table A1, A2). Some of the parameters refer to empirical studies (such
as Tokutsu 1992), but most parameters are necessarily without empirical basis and are set low in order
not to overestimate the feasibility of the double dividend4.
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Table 2: The production sectors and their cost share
* The “main cost” factor depends on the comparison to the average of sectors except for energy sectors. 
Abbreviation: labr=labor, cptl=capital, enrg=energy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Costs
Material 51.0% 41.7% 43.8% 62.2% 60.3% 61.5% 57.3% 51.4% 61.1%
Energy 3.1% 1.4% 3.1% 1.4% 1.8% 2.8% 7.8% 4.8% 4.2%
Labor 24.0% 11.0% 25.6% 15.1% 25.6% 20.4% 14.3% 24.4% 20.1%
Capital 18.4% 43.3% 23.9% 10.7% 9.6% 12.6% 16.0% 16.0% 11.8%
indirect tax 3.5% 2.6% 3.6% 10.7% 2.6% 2.6% 4.6% 3.4% 2.8%
main cost -- capital labr/cptl material labor material energy enrg/labr energy
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Costs
Material 51.0% 64.6% 53.1% 41.4% 29.7% 34.4% 43.8% 13.6% 27.6%
Energy 3.1% 1.2% 0.8% 8.4% 1.3% 0.9% 3.1% 35.9% 18.4%
Labor 24.0% 21.1% 35.1% 35.5% 40.2% 23.8% 25.6% 4.0% 13.1%
Capital 18.4% 11.4% 8.6% 12.1% 25.8% 37.8% 23.9% 6.7% 34.4%
indirect tax 3.5% 1.7% 2.3% 2.6% 3.0% 3.1% 3.6% 39.9% 6.5%
main cost -- material labor labr/enrg labr/cptl capital -- -- --
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3. Policy Options to be analyzed in the ETR-CGE Model.
In our analysis, we select a policy option, set the CO2-emission target, and then run the computer
program5, which will give the result of production and demand levels, price and employment levels etc.,
and the carbon-energy tax rate necessary to reach the goal.
The carbon-energy tax (C&E tax) is taxed on energy commodities according to the carbon and
energy contents (T yen per ton coal and the same T yen per 107kcal, which means about 50:50 taxation
on both components for coal). The goal of CO2-reduction is 6% reduction in 2010 compared to the 1990
level, according to (a strict interpretation of) the obligation of the Kyoto-Protocol. Because the emission
was 287.2 million tC (ton in carbon) in 1990, Japan must reduce emissions from 311.6 million tC (1995)
to 270.0 million tC (2010). 
We set six policies to the ETR. The result of these scenarios are able to be anticipated according to
the theory of second best taxation.
(1) Reference Scenario: No CO2-reduction and no energy taxation (see Table 3). This scenario is
calibrated to the CO2-emission forecast of the ‘IEE Japan, Long-term Energy Demand and Supply
Outlook’ (EDMC 2000, p. 222).
(2) C&E Tax and Government Expenditure: a C&E tax is introduced to reduce CO2-emissions. The
additional revenue from C&E tax flows to additional government expenditure. All purchased items are
increased proportionally so that the government’s expenditure patterns are kept unchanged. In this sce-
nario, no double dividend will occur (PE>0, RE=0, IE<0).
(3) C&E Tax and Redistribution: The whole C&E tax revenue is used to raise the social security
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Table 3: The Reference Scenario
* The energy consumption is calculated from data in the Input-Output Table, and therefore not necessarily compati-
ble to the other energy statistics.
1995 2000 2005 2010
Annual Growth rate 
2010/1995
Real GDP Growth (per year) 1.31% 1.53% 1.45%
Real GDP (trillion yen) 505 538.9 581.4 624.6 1.43%
Labor Demand (trillion yen) 293 312 337 360 1.39%
Labor Supply (trillion yen) 308 330 353 378 1.38%
Unemployment rate (%) 5.00% 5.39% 4.34% 4.79%
Energy Consumption (1013kcal)* 463 479 490 513 0.69%
Energy Intensity of GDP (1995=100) 100 96.9 91.9 89.6
CO2-Emission（Million tC） 312 322 330 344 0.67%
transfer. The social security benefit for all income classes is raised proportionally. Therefore this sce-
nario will be advantageous for the lower income groups because they receive a higher proportion of
income as a social security benefit. This may be an important option for Japan facing an aging society. In
this scenario, too, there will be no double dividend (PE>0, RE=0, IE<0).
(4) C&E Tax and SSC Cut: The whole C&E tax revenue is used to reduce the social security contri-
bution (SSC) on labor which is paid by employers and employees. The rate of social security contribu-
tions is assumed to be constant across all production sectors. The reduction rate depends on the scale
of C&E tax revenue. In this scenario the weak double dividend is sure, because the reduction of the
SSC-rate leads to a lower excess burden in the labor market (PE>0, RE>0, IE<0). Whether the strong
double dividend really occurs, however, depends on the relative scale of the RE and the IE.  
(5) C&E Tax and Income Tax Cut: The whole C&E tax revenue is used to reduce the rate of
income tax (tax on the sum of labor and capital income). Tax rates are reduced by the same percentage
point for all tax brackets6 so that the effect of this reduction will be almost proportional among income
classes. It should be noted that income tax in this model is not distortionary unlike social security con-
tributions. Namely, income tax cannot be avoided e.g. by reducing the labor supply intentionally.
Therefore there will be no double dividend in this scenario (PE>0, RE=0, IE<0).
(6) C&E Tax, SSC Cut, and Competitiveness: in addition to scenario 4, a special treatment is given
to energy intensive sectors (sector 5, 6, 7, 8) so that they will not be put at a competitive disadvantage
against foreign businesses without comparable burden7. The C&E tax rate for these sectors is reduced
to the half of the normal rate that other sectors incur. In this scenario, too, the weak double dividend is
sure, because the reduction of SSC-rate leads to a lower excess burden in the labor market (PE>0,
RE>0, IE<0). It depends on the relative scale of the RE and the IE whether the strong double dividend
really occurs.
In the Reference Scenario, it is assumed that the capital stock in production sectors increases
about 1% per year, and there is an “energy-increasing” (=higher energy productivity) technological
progress represented by scale parameters in production functions. The growth of labor supply is set in
order to keep the unemployment rate at about 5%. Other parameters are set constant. The assumption
of the Reference Scenario may now seem to be counterfactual, above all the coexistence of a relatively
high unemployment rate and a relatively high growth rate. However as this is a simulation analysis the
absolute level is not a crucial problem, as the effects of each scenario are evaluated on difference from
the results of the reference scenario. 
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4. Results and evaluations
4.1. CO2-emission and necessary carbon-energy tax rates
The CO2-emission paths are set the same among five C&E-tax scenarios. But the necessary C&E tax
rates differ according to the economic effect of scenarios (see Table 4). A scenario with a higher eco-
nomic activity tends to require a higher C&E tax rate to meet the emission target, otherwise the energy
demand will be boosted and CO2-emissions will be higher than the target. For example, the SSC-Cut
Scenario (4) leads to a relatively higher employment and GDP level, therefore the C&E tax rate also
must be higher than in other scenarios. In the Competitiveness Scenario (6), the (normal) C&E tax rate
must be higher not only because of a favorable economic effect but also because energy intensive sec-
tors are assumed to pay only half of the normal rate of C&E tax and therefore other sectors have to
compensate for this. The reason for preferable economic effect in scenario 4 or 6 will be discussed in
the next paragraph.
4.2. The GDP and Employment
Table 5 shows the result of the GDP, labor demand level and growth rates. The results of scenarios
Government Expenditure (2), Redistribution (3) and Income Tax Cut (5) are very similar, and these
results are worse than those of scenarios SSC Cut (4) or Competitiveness (6). This means that it is less
important for the aggregate economic performance whom the carbon-energy tax revenue flows to (gov-
ernment, lower or higher income household) than whether the revenue recycling option reduces the
labor cost. In scenario 2, 3, and 5, the GDP and employment level will be lower than the Reference Case
(1). Higher production costs and household living costs caused by the environmental taxation lead to a
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Table 4: The CO2-Emission and the Carbon-Energy Tax Rates (thousand yen/tC*)
* The sum of tax rates on carbon and energy component for coal
Scenarios 1995 2000 2005 2010
Base-line CO2-Emission（Million tC） 311.6 321.9 329.8 344.4
Restricted CO2-Emission (Million tC) 311.6 311.6 290.8 270.0
Reduction Rate (% of Baseline) -- -3.2％ -11.9％ -21.7％
C&E Tax and ...
2. Government Expenditure 0 2.87 11.74 23.95
3. Redistribution 0 2.93 12.10 24.86
4. SSC-Cut 0 3.01 12.63 26.33
5. Income Tax Cut 0 2.92 12.09 24.83
6. SSC-Cut & Competitiveness 0 4.03 16.88 34.92
lower economic activity level8, and the revenue recycling in those scenarios is insufficient to compen-
sate for the economic loss. Despite this, the loss is very small.
On the other hand, in scenario 4, the reduction of the rate of social security contribution leads to a
lower employer wage, which results in a slightly higher labor demand and a higher economic activity
level. That is, in this scenario the revenue recycling effect overwhelmed the tax interaction effect hence
the strong- and employment double dividend was accomplished. The favorable result can be boosted by the
special treatment for energy intensive sectors (scenario 6). It is not only due to the easing of the price
hike of energy-intensive basic materials, but also because a greater C&E tax revenue has enabled the
additional reduction of the SSC rate, which in turn leads to a lower excess burden in the labor market. 
4.3. Sectoral Production
The change of sectoral production is shown in table 6. As the results of scenarios 2, 3 and 5 are
very similar, those results are represented by the Scenario Government Expenditure (2). In each one of
the scenarios, the production of energy sectors (14, 15, 16) has distinctly decreased, which is the main
purpose of the energy taxation. In scenario 2, every sector produces less than in Reference Scenario
(1). As can be observed, especially in energy-intensive sectors such as the chemical sector , production
lose up to 3.2%, but non-energy-intensive sectors such as fibers (4) or non-transportation services (12)
suffer only slightly. 
Even in the SSC Cut Scenario (4) in which a strong double dividend occurred, the sectors that
increased are minorities, that is, only two non-energy-intensive sectors (foods (3) and non-transporta-
tion services (12)) gain. Because the production share of sector 12 is very large, the increase of produc-
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Table 5: The Real GDP and Labor Demand (Level and Growth)
Scenario 1995 2000 2005 2010
Annual growth rate 
2010/1995
1. Reference GDP（trillion Yen） 505.0 538.9 581.4 624.6 1.43%
Labor Demand（tril. yen） 292.7 312.0 337.1 360.1 1.39%
2. C&E Tax and GDP（tril. Yen） 505.0 538.5 578.4 616.9 1.34%
Government Expenditure Labor Demand（tril. yen） 292.7 311.8 335.3 355.7 1.31%
3. C&E Tax and GDP（tril. Yen） 505.0 538.4 578.4 617.2 1.35%
Redistribution Labor Demand（tril. yen） 292.7 311.7 335.1 355.6 1.30%
4. C&E Tax and GDP（tril. Yen） 505.0 539.1 582.0 625.5 1.44%
SSC-Cut Labor Demand（tril. yen） 292.7 312.4 338.4 362.6 1.44%
5. C&E Tax and GDP（tril. Yen） 505.0 538.4 578.4 617.2 1.35%
Income Tax Cut Labor Demand（tril. yen） 292.7 311.7 335.1 355.6 1.30%
6. C&E, SSC-Cut & GDP（tril. Yen） 505.0 539.3 583.1 628.3 1.47%
Competitiveness Labor Demand（tril. yen） 292.7 312.6 339.4 365.1 1.48%
tion in this sector compensated the loss of other sectors and therefore overall economic gain occurred
(see also Table 5). In the Competitiveness Scenario (6), because the prices of basic materials were kept
low, and because higher employment leads to a higher consumption demand, most of the non-energy
sectors increased. Although energy extensive sectors and consumers have to pay higher C&E tax (see
Table 3), the economy as a whole grows faster than in the Reference Scenario.
4.4. Distributional Implications
In this model, private households are divided into 5 income groups, each of which consists of 20%
of the total households. This enables us to analyze the asymmetric effects of the ETR on different
income classes. In the tables 6, 7 and 8, class I is of the lowest income and class V is the highest. Three
indicators are chosen concerning the distributive effects, the index of household living cost, nominal-
and real disposable income. 
Table 7 shows the change of the index of household living costs. As the living cost differs among
income classes, only the rate of deviation from the Reference Scenario is shown in the table. In spite of
the fact that the C&E tax rate is high enough to more than triple the price of coal or crude oil, the
increase of living costs is very small in every case (between 1 to 2 %), because the energy cost con-
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Table 6: The Sectoral Production
2010
Sector 1995
1. agricult. forest & fish. 16042 19322 1.25 19017 -1.59 19319 -0.03 19358 0.17 
2. mining 1490 1835 1.40 1795 -2.20 1820 -0.87 1830 -0.34 
3. foods 38857 46535 1.21 45936 -1.29 46680 0.31 46740 0.44 
4. fibers & textiles 11142 12909 0.99 12819 -0.68 12883 -0.19 12910 0.02 
5. pulp, paper & wood. 17800 22352 1.53 21841 -2.29 22207 -0.66 22393 0.18 
6. chemical etc. 27309 33399 1.35 32321 -3.23 32798 -1.80 33056 -1.03 
7. ceramics, cement, etc. 9696 12391 1.65 12076 -2.55 12266 -1.01 12395 0.03 
8. steel, iron etc. 42144 52656 1.50 51177 -2.80 52068 -1.11 52558 -0.18 
9. machinery etc. 156593 189737 1.29 185282 -2.33 189043 -0.35 190231 0.28 
10. construction 88128 114659 1.77 112371 -2.00 114159 -0.44 115470 0.71 
11. transportation 50114 61709 1.40 60076 -2.64 61098 -0.99 61238 -0.76 
12. non-trans. services 441181 540900 1.37 536389 -0.84 542550 0.30 544675 0.70 
13. not classifiable 5303 6461 1.32 6345 -1.80 6430 -0.49 6457 -0.07 
14. fuel mining 169 159 -0.41 135 -15.37 135 -14.94 134 -15.49 
15. oil & coal prod. 8962 10210 0.87 8328 -18.43 8348 -18.24 8086 -20.80 
16. elec., gas & heat. 18810 20933 0.72 18579 -11.25 18711 -10.62 18441 -11.91 
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tributes to only a small part in most production sectors. The lower the income class is, the higher the
increase of living costs, because the share of energy expenditure is larger in lower income households,
but the difference is still very small.
Table 8 and table 9 shows the change of (nominal and real) disposable income, which depends
highly on the method of revenue recycling. If the C&E tax revenue flows to government expenditure
(scenario 2), the disposable income of all income classes is reduced because no household receives
compensation of income loss induced by the C&E tax. The reason why lower income classes suffer less
in terms of the nominal income is because the commodity pattern of government expenditure is rela-
tively labor intensive and income there consists mainly of labor-induced income. Similarly, the case of
Redistribution (scenario 3) is favorable for lower income households, but the reason is more direct. On
the other hand, the option of income tax reduction increases the nominal income almost proportionally
(scenario 5), but households have to bear the C&E tax burden reflected in higher prices and therefore
the real income drops only slightly. When the revenue is used to reduce the labor cost (social security
contribution), the increased after-contribution wage and the increase in employment leads to a higher
income level especially for lower income households. This is due to the aforementioned higher propor-
tion of labor income (scenario 4). When the C&E tax for energy intensive sectors is reduced to half
(scenario 6), every income class gains almost proportionally (or rather regressive in real terms) because
not only the labor income but also the capital income increases.
We can summarize here that the overall effect of an environmental tax reform on vertical distribu-
tion cannot be expected only by the change of household living costs, because different revenue recy-
cling options bring about different income effects on each income class.
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Table 7: Change of the Index of Household Living Cost (% relative to Ref. 2010)
Income quintile groups I II III IV V
1 Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 C&E Tax and Gov. Expenditure 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.00 0.94 
3 C&E Tax and Redistribution 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.08 1.02 
4 C&E Tax and Labor Cost 1.13 1.14 1.13 1.06 0.99 
5 C&E Tax and Income Tax 1.14 1.15 1.14 1.08 1.02 
6 C&E, Labor & Competitiveness 1.63 1.63 1.61 1.53 1.44 
5. Conclusion
We have analyzed the effects of an environmental tax reform (ETR) using a computable general
equilibrium model. Greater attention is paid here on whether the “double dividend” is likely to be
achieved. As we have discussed in section 4, the GDP and employment level will rise slightly in scenar-
ios in which the revenue from C&E tax is used to reduce the rate of social security contributions in
order to reduce the labor cost. In scenario 6, the special treatment for energy intensive sectors (reduc-
tion of C&E tax rate to 50 % of normal rate) have resulted in an enhanced positive effect shown by sce-
nario 4. In other scenarios (2, 3, 5), there will be no double dividend because the C&E tax revenue will
not be used to reduce the excess burden of existing tax or social security system. If there have been
other existing distortionary taxes in this model, the reduction of them by using C&E tax revenue will
have resulted in another (at least a “weak”) double dividend. It is often said that energy taxation has a
regressive effect. But depending on the way of revenue recycling, the distributional effects can be made
proportional or rather friendly for lower income groups. These results suggest that we should always
take the revenue recycling side of the ETR into account. 
Crucial for this analysis are the assumption of an imperfect labor market and constant nominal
wage, which may not be usual in an ordinary computable general equilibrium model. In a sensitivity
analysis assuming the labor market equilibrium, the GDP level increased in none of scenarios, but the
employment has slightly increased in the SSC Cut Scenario (employment double dividend). Other sensi-
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Table 8: Change of the Nominal Disposable Income (% relative to Ref. 2010)
Income quintile groups I II III IV V
1 Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 C&E Tax and Gov. Expenditure -1.27 -1.37 -1.51 -1.53 -1.64 
3 C&E Tax and Redistribution 2.20 1.31 -0.14 -0.03 -0.99 
4 C&E Tax and Labor Cost 1.28 1.24 1.27 1.19 1.13 
5 C&E Tax and Income Tax 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 
6 C&E, Labor & Competitiveness 2.02 2.03 2.13 2.04 2.04 
Table 9: Change of the Real Disposable Income (% relative to Ref. 2010)
Income quintile groups I II III IV V
1 Reference 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 C&E Tax and Gov. Expenditure -2.32 -2.42 -2.55 -2.51 -2.56
3 C&E Tax and Redistribution 1.04 0.16 -1.27 -1.10 -1.99
4 C&E Tax and Labor Cost 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.14
5 C&E Tax and Income Tax -0.94 -0.97 -0.97 -0.92 -0.84
6 C&E, Labor & Competitiveness 0.38 0.40 0.51 0.51 0.59
tivity analysis (not mentioned here) has shown that the result depends on parameters of elasticity of
substitution, that is, the strong second dividend may vanish if the factor substitution in the industry is
supposed to be inelastic.
In this analysis, there are several shortcomings in the model building which could- or should be
improved in the future. Firstly, the economic subjects are not supposed to be intertemporally rational.
Secondly, the imperfect labor market is modeled by the assumption of a constant nominal wage and dis-
equilibrium in labor supply and demand which may be too simple. In these points, better specifications
and a better modeling strategy is required in future studies.
Appendix: the ETR-CGE Model
1. The Input-Output Table
Using the detailed 1995 Input-Output Table, production sectors are integrated to 16 sectors. Three
energy sectors (fuel mining (14), oil & coal products (15), and electricity, gas & heat (16)) are disaggre-
gated into 14 energy commodities (3 primary energies, 8 coal and oil products, electricity, urban gas,
and heat supply). Therefore there are 27 commodities including the 13 non-energy commodities. The
primary production factors are labor and capital. Final demand sectors are private consumption, public
consumption and investment, private investment, export and import. The private consumption is divid-
ed into 5 income classes. The quantity table enables us to calculate the quantity of sectoral energy con-
sumption and CO2-emission.
2. Equations of CGE Models (excerpt).
The Model is basically a static model. The calculations of the different time periods are connected only
by capital accumulation and technological progress. Therefore, the time-index (t) is omitted in most of
the following equations except for the equations of capital dynamics. Most uppercase letters are quanti-
ty variables and the lowercase letters are rate variables, and letters without suffixes often stand for the
sum. 
(1) Production of Sector j
a) CES production function and the profit maximization problem
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X A M A E A L A K1 2 3 4j j j j j j j j j
1
j j j j j= + + +
- - - -
-
t t t t t; E 1
( )max P X P M P E wL K Ks.t.j j Mj j Ej j j j j- + + = 0 2
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X j : production quantity, M j : material (aggregate of materials, intermediate goods and services), 
E j : energy (aggregate of energy commodities), L j : labor, K j : capital service (constant to the initial
level K j 0), PMj : price index of aggregate material, PEj : price index of aggregate energy (see price
index), w : employer wage rate, A1 j -- A4 j : scale parameters, jt : parameter related to elasticity of sub-
stitution, that is, ( )/1j j j= -t v v (see table A1). The real variables are expressed in monetary units
(yen), but the relative price is unitless. The production and factor demand functions are derived using
first order conditions of profit maximization problem. 
If the capital stock is constant in the short run, the production is determined by the initial capital
stock (K j 0) and the price of this sector’s product ( Pj ), price indices and wage.
b) Production
X
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A P
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c) Factor demand
; ;M
P A
P
A
X
E
P A
P
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Table A1: Elasticity of Substitution ( jv )
1. agricult. forest & fish. 0.8 9. machinery etc. 0.2
2. mining 0.2 10. construction 0.4
3. foods 0.6 11. transportation 0.6
4. fibers & textiles 0.1 12. non-trans. services 0.6
5. pulp, paper & wood. 0.6 13. not classifiable 0.5
6. chemical etc. 0.5 14. fuel mining 0.3
7. ceramics, cement, etc. 0.6 15. oil & coal prod. 0.8
8. steel, iron etc. 0.3 16. elec., gas & heat. 0.6
Table A2: Other Elasticity Parameters
elasticity of substitution: material ( Mjv ) 0.1 Elasticity of substitution: consumption ( kn ) 0.5
elasticity of substitution: energy ( Ejv ) 0.1 interest rate elasticity of saving rate ( Skf ) 0.4
elast. of subst.: transportation energy ( EMjv ) 0.2 wage elasticity of labor supply ( L k1f ) 0.1
elast. of subst.: non-transport. energy ( ENjv ) 0.2 price elasticity of labor supply ( L k2f ) -0.1
excess-profit elasticity of investment ( jh ) 1.0
Elasticity of substitution: Armington’s func-
tion (for all sectors) ( id )
0.5
(2) Aggregate Input Factor (Material)
a) CES material aggregate function
( ) ;M A M i 1 13j ij ij
i
1
Mj
Mj
+= =
-
-
t
t
!
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V
X
W
W
W
5
M j : material aggregate, M ij : quantity of individual input commodity, Aij : a scale parameter, Mjt : a
parameter related to elasticity of substitution, P
ij
D
: demander price of each commodity for sector 
j including an excise tax.
An individual material demand function is derived solving the cost minimization problem.
b) individual material demand function
M
P A
P
A
M
ij
Mj ij
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The energy aggregate has a similar CES function and individual material demand functions, and
therefore the explanation is omitted here (a slight difference is that the energy aggregate has a two
stage structure, aggregating transportation and non-transportation energies separately). The elasticities
of substitution between individual commodities are kept very low (by material, 0.1; by energy, 0.2 for
individual energy and 0.1 for substitutability of two sub-aggregates), supposing the substitutability is
very limited.
(3) Behavior of Private Households
a) CES utility function with a separated leisure term
( )U B C B LEISk ik ik
i
lk k
1
k
k
= +
-
-
n
n
!
J
L
K
KK
N
P
O
OO
7
For the k-th income class from the lowest; U k : utility, Bik : scale parameter, Cik : consumption of
the i-th good, kn : a parameter related to the elasticity of substitution, Blk : marginal utility of leisure,
LEISk : leisure.
The whole time budget of a household (in monetary units) is assumed to be divided into labor and
leisure by 1:5 ratio. Because there is only one kind of efficiency-unit-labor, we assume that a higher
income household is able to supply more labor (or has larger time budget) in proportion to the work-
place revenue in the “Family Income and Expenditure Survey”. The capital holding is distributed
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according to annual revenue. Note that the annual revenue is more progressive than the work-place rev-
enue.
b) Household income
( ) ( )HHI w t L t rK1k L k r k= - + - 8
HHI k : household income, w tL- : rate of employee wage, tr : capital tax rate, r : average profit rate
of all industries, K k : capital holding
c) Pre-tax revenue
R HHI LSTk k k= + 9
Rk : pre-tax revenue, LSTk : social security benefit transfer
d) Income tax function
TI HHIk k k k:= +a b ¡0
TI k : the income tax burden on the k-th income class. The marginal tax rate kb is statistically esti-
mated and differs according to income class.
e) Saving
( ) ( )S s ir R TI TODk k k k k$= - - ¡1
Sk : saving, TODk : other indirect tax burden. The terms in the parentheses stands for the dispos-
able income. ( )s irk is the saving propensity function depending on the market interest rate ( )ir .
( ) ( )S ir S irk k
Sk$=
f
0 ¡2
Skf is the interest rate elasticity of saving propensity.
f) Labor supply function
LS LS w t
w t
CPI
CPI
k k
L
L
L
K
k
L
0
1 2k k
=
-
-
f f
0 0
0 e eo o ¡3
LSk : labor supply, hereafter, suffix “0” means the initial level, w tL- : rate of employee wage, w :
rate of employer wage, t L : social security contribution rate, CPI k : index of household living cost, L k1f :
wage elasticity of labor supply (positive), L k2f : living-cost elasticity of labor supply (negative). 
g) Consumption expenditure (Y k)
Y R TI TOD Sk k k k k= - - - ¡4
h) Consumption budget restriction
Y P Ck i
C
ik#= ! ¡5
P
i
C
: consumer price of the i-th good, Cik: consumption of i-th good.
i) Consumption function for i-th good
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C
: consumer price of the h-th good, B*k : scale parameter
(4) The Government Account and Taxes
There are taxes in our model derived from “the Annual Report on National Accounts” and “the Input-
Output Table”. Their tax rates are computed in relation to the tax bases on our data set.
a) Government revenue
GR TL TK TP TM TI TOD GAI ECOTAX= + + + + + + + ¡7
GR: government revenue. The revenue consists of 7 tax revenues and the government’s asset
income. Tax revenue consists of each tax rate and tax base. In C&E Tax scenarios, the ECOTAX (car-
bon-energy tax) is added.
b) Government expenditure 
GEX GR LST CG IG= - = + ¡8
The government expenditure is equal to the government revenue (GR) minus social security trans-
fer (LST). The expenditure is divided into the government consumption (CG) and the government
investment (IG) in fixed proportion. CG and IG are again allotted to each commodity in fixed propor-
tion. It is assumed that this equation always holds and the government’s budget is balanced. 
c) Government’s asset income
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Table A3: The Government Revenue
Type of Taxes How they are derived from the SNA-Data
Revenue 
(million yen)
social security contribution social security contribution of households 
on labor (TL) (except for the lump-sum national pension contribution) 48,014,400
capital tax (TK) corporate direct tax and penalties 18,155,600 
product & consumption tax (TP) indirect tax minus subvention for all sectors (in I-O table) 32,159,124 
import tax (TM) tariff, import consumption tax (in I-O table ) 2,878,586 
private income tax (TI) income tax on private household income 28,480,400 
other direct tax (TOD) household's other direct taxes, contributions and penalties 3,624,054 
government's asset income (GAI) residual of government revenue minus tax revenue 17,058,406 
Sum 150,370,570
GAI r K G:= ¡9
K G : government’s capital holding 
d) Carbon and energy tax payment
( )ECOTAX tene cal tcoal col E Burdr j n1 3 1hj hj hj hj j: : : : += + = + + ™0
ECOTAX hj : the h-th energy commodity consumed in sector j (Ehj). The calhj is the energy intensity
and colhj is the carbon intensity. The tcoal and tene is the rate of carbon-energy tax, each on carbon or
energy component of the energy commodity. Burdrj is the burden rate of the sector j (used in the
Competitiveness scenario), e.g. 0.5 for energy intensive industries and 1.0 for other sectors.
(5) Wage, Price and Price Indices
a) w: rate of wage paid by employers; w tL- : wage rate after tax and contribution
A reduction of labor cost enabled by the ECOTAX benefits both employer and employee, reducing
w and increasing w tL- by the same rate
b) Numerair: Index of pre-ecotax price of all commodities
c) Pre-ecotax price of a domestic product i:  P t
i
S
i
P
+
P
i
S
: producer price, t
i
P
: excise tax (specific duty)
d) Demand price of j-th sector
( )P P tene cal tcoal col Burdr
ij
D
i
d
hj hj j: : := + + ™1
P
i
d
is price of domestic supply of i-th good including import (see (6) Foreign trade). The second
term stands for the rate of the ecotax. This price is written P
i
C
for final demand sectors. 
e) GDP price index
P
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PGDP : GDP price index, i : commodity number, Pi
C
: final demand price, Cik : houshold consumption, 
CGi : government consumption, IGi : government investment, IPi : private investment, EX i : export, 
IM i : import
f) Investment price index
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g) Index of household living cost:   CIP
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h) Price index of material aggregate:   P
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(6) Foreign Trade
This model doesn’t explicitly include the foreign sector as an economic agent. Foreign trade is rep-
resented by the Armington function. From equation a) and b), the following equations are derived.
a) The Armington function
( ) ( )Sup G X G IM1 2i i i
d
i i
1
i i i= +
- -
-
d d d; E ™6
Supi : domestic supply (combined good of domestic and imported good), X i
d
: domestic production, IM i :
import, G* i : scale parameters, id : parameter related to the elasticity of substitution, Pi
d
: price of
domestic supplies, P t
i
S
i
P
+ : price of domestic products, ( )t P1
i
m
i
F
+ : price of imported goods including
import tax rate ( )t
i
m
.
b) Hypothetical cost restriction 
( ) ( )P Sup P t X t P IM1
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c) (Pre-ecotax) price of domestic supply
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d) Quantity function of domestic supply
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e) Quantity function of import
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The trade surplus is assumed to be constant, that is, the sum of export is calculated by the sum of
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import adding the surplus. This model has no exchange rate mechanism.
(7) Capital Dynamics
a) Investment function
( )IP inv X z r ir1j j j j0
j$= + -
h_ i £1
inv j 0 : initial investment rate (I Xj j0 0), Xj: production, z : ad-hoc coefficient, rj : profit rate of sec-
tor j, ir : market interest rate, jh : elasticity parameter. This equation means the investment of sector j
depends on the production and net profit rate.
b) Sum of investment: IPD IPj= !
c) Capital dynamics of sector j  
K K IP PI DEP,j t jt jt t jt1 : := + - l x+ _ i £2
K jt : capital service, PI t : investment price index, DEPjt : depreciation, l : parameter relating the capital
service with capital stock (properly calibrated), x : parameter related to the time interval.
d) Demand for a investment good: IPD sinv IPDi i $= , sinvi : share of i-th good in investment
(8) The Model Solving
Most parameters and tax rates are calibrated to the initial data set, but the elasticity parameters or
some other parameters are set outside the model’s framework (table A2). The parameter assumption
may have influence on the result quantitatively, but according to a sensitivity analysis that is not shown
in this paper, there is no critical qualitative difference concerning the double dividend possibility.
This model has 4 time periods with 5 year intervals (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010). In each period,
prices, and the market interest rate are adjusted to clear all commodity markets and the financial mar-
ket (market of investment and saving, without international capital flow). The rate of carbon-energy
(C&E) tax is adjusted to meet the CO2-emission restriction of each period. The revenue of carbon-ener-
gy tax is recycled in different ways according to scenarios, where the exact amount is spent by the gov-
ernment (scenario 2), transferred to the family (scenario 3), or used to reduce income tax rates (sce-
nario 5) or social security contribution rates (scenario 4 and 6).
There is no adjustment in the labor market (pre-contribution wage is fixed), and the sectoral capi-
tal is fixed in the short-run. The labor supply grows autonomously and labor demand increases in accor-
dance with economic growth. The investment decision for production sectors is also myopic, based only
on the net profit rate of each period concerned. Sectors with a higher profit rate invest more, which
leads to more capital stock and a lower profit rate in the next period. The parameter x in equation 7-c
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(above) is set to 5.1, because the time interval is 5 years and annual growth rate of every sector is
assumed to be about 1% (1.015≒ 1.051). There is also improvement of energy efficiency in production
sectors, which is represented by the autonomous increase of the scale parameter A2 j in production
function.
NOTES
1 See, Environment Agency (1996, 1997, 1998) or Ministry of Environment (2001).
2 It is based on a rigorous interpretation of the Kyoto-Protocol, according to which Japan has to reduce 6
different greenhouse gas emissions by 2008-2012 by 6% under the level of 1990. Because several mecha-
nisms such as tradable emission permit, CDM, JI or sink (recognition of forestry absorption) are available,
the goal will not be so hard. 
3 Here, the labor income is gained only by formal work and (also involuntary) non-working time is regarded
to be a part of leisure. 
4 By and large, the higher the elasticity parameters, the bigger the revenue recycling effect (RE), which
leads to a higher feasibility of strong double dividend.
5 This program is written in the VBA of the Microsoft Excel®. Data necessary for the calculations has been
input in the spreadsheet. 
6 For example by reduction of 5%, the highest quintile: 40%=>35% and the lowest: 10%=>5%. In model,
five income groups have different tax rates, but each income group has single flat tax rate.
7 This is confined only to internationally competing non-energy sectors. The sector 5 (pulp, paper & wood-
en ware) is not energy intensive in the table 2. But the pulp industry is a typical energy intensive sector,
and therefore the sector 5 is as a whole treated as energy intensive in this analysis.
8 In the same way as many previous studies, it is assumed here that the labor supply decreases when the
general price level rises so that the IE is negative. However, it should be mentioned that this assumption is
not necessarily supported by empirical studies (Goodstein 2003)
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日本における環境税制改革の二重の配当
（平成７年産業連関表に基づく応用一般均衡分析）
朴　　　勝　俊
要　　　約
本論文では，日本において環境税制改革が実施された場合に，いわゆる「二重の配当」が成立しう
るかどうかを，応用一般均衡分析（CGE）を用いて検討する．ここでいう環境税制改革とは，温暖化
対策のための税を導入するだけでなく，その税収を用いて経済に歪みを与えている既存の税を引き下
げる政策である．本稿の CGEモデルは 1997年の産業連関表に基づいた多部門モデルで，16の生産
部門，27種の財（うち 14種がエネルギー関係）を含むうえ，民間消費部門が所得階層別に５分割さ
れており，分配効果を見ることもできる．これを用いて京都議定書の温室効果ガス削減目標（1990
年比６％削減）の達成に必要な炭素・エネルギー税率と，それが経済に及ぼす影響を推計する．結果
としては，2010年までに必要となる税率は炭素トンあたり 30000円前後となるが，経済全体に与え
る影響は概して軽微である．しかも，税収が労働コストの引き下げのために活かされれば，経済にと
っても若干プラスの影響（GDP・雇用の増加）が生じるが，これには非自発的失業の仮定が重要な
役割を果たしている．さらに，重工業部門に対する特別措置（炭素・エネルギー税率の半減）の効果
を分析した結果，雇用と GDPへの好ましい影響は拡大したが，他の産業部門や消費者にはさらに高
い炭素・エネルギー税率が必要となる．分配効果に関しては，環境税制改革による物価上昇そのもの
は低所得層に不利であるが，税収還元も含めた政策全体が所得に与える影響はおおかた比例的である
とみられる．
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